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Creating the cultures of the future: cultural strategy, policy and institutions 
in Gramsci 
Part Three: Is there a theory of cultural policy in Gramsci’s prison 
notebooks? 
Paola Merli, University of Nottingham 
Introduction 
In this article, I argue that Gramsci’s prison notes on questions of cultural strategy, 
policy and institutions, which have so far been largely overlooked by scholars, provide 
further analytical insights to those offered by his more general concepts. Together they 
enrich the theoretical underpinnings for critical frameworks of analysis as well as for 
radical practices of cultural strategy, cultural policy-making and cultural organisation.  1
On the basis of a detailed analysis of these notes, I then answer the question of whether 
they amount to a theory of cultural policy.  
Cold War ideological conflict seems to have had a significant role in the neglect 
of this area of Gramsci’s thought through the creation of an intellectual milieu hostile to 
the very notion of cultural policy. In 1952, two years after the first posthumous 
publication of Gramsci’s Notebook 23, which included references to the concept of 
‘cultural policy’ (‘politica culturale’),  the prominent Italian liberal-socialist 2
philosopher Norberto Bobbio, who would become an influential scholar of Gramsci, 
published an article titled ‘Politica culturale e politica della cultura’.  The article had 3
no apparent relationship with Gramsci’s notes on cultural policy, but was a response to 
appeals made by the recently constituted European Association of Culture to 
intellectuals of the world on the dangers of the relationship between politics and culture, 
particularly in the form of ‘cultural policy’. The Association had been constituted in 
1950 with the participation of intellectuals and artists like Julien Benda, André Breton, 
Marc Chagall, Benedetto Croce, Thomas Mann, Giuseppe Ungaretti, and Bobbio 
himself.  According to Bobbio, the appeals recommended that culture should be neither 4
‘politicised or politically engaged’ (cultura politicizzata or ‘cultura impegnata’) nor 
‘apolitical or disengaged’ (cultura apolitica or ‘cultura non impegnata’).   In the first 5
case, culture was seen as instrumental to social objectives pursued through political 
means: in this way it was ‘subordinated’ and therefore ‘discouraged’. In the second 
case, culture was considered socially ‘incommunicable’: in this way it was ‘indifferent’ 
and therefore increasingly ‘aimless, sterile, capricious’.  The Association’s prescribed 6
approach was, instead, that culture and intellectuals had to be above politics and society. 
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It went under the name ‘politica della cultura’ (‘cultural politics’ or ‘politics of 
culture’), and consisted of ‘politics made by men of culture for the ends of culture 
itself’.  7
However, the most dangerous approach, and the real antithesis to the 
recommended one, was that of ‘politica culturale’ (‘cultural policy’), which consisted 
of ‘culture made by politicians for political ends’.  Through this intervention, Bobbio 8
presented himself as an accurate interpreter of the preoccupations of all intellectuals of 
his time: ‘all men of culture, I believe, feel in this moment the danger of cultural policy 
from any side it might come’.  In the public debate that followed, Bobbio insisted that 9
cultural policy was necessarily characteristic of totalitarian regimes: even liberal 
democracies, in his view, became totalitarian the very moment they started to have a 
‘cultural policy’.   10
Arguably, this hostility to the idea of cultural policy, added to Croce’s earlier 
strenuous rejection of Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis as a reduction of philosophy to 
political interests that should not be promoted amongst the Italian masses,  constituted 11
the background for the parallel strategic attempt, on the part of liberal-socialist 
intellectuals, to conflate Gramsci’s ideas on culture with the cultural policy of the Italian 
Communist Party, and of both with Zhdanovism.  All this seems to have created, right 12
from the beginning, an intellectual milieu hostile to an open discussion of Gramsci’s 
reflections on cultural policy.  
Problems of reception of Gramsci’s notes on cultural policy do not seem to be 
limited to the Italian context, or to have disappeared with the end of the Cold War. 
English translations of Gramsci’s expression ‘politica culturale’ as ‘cultural politics’ in 
the Selections from cultural writings of 1985 have probably had the effect of 
obfuscating the actual meaning of the original expression for Anglo-American readers.  13
On the other hand, the claim made by the Australian ‘governmentality’ school of 
cultural policy studies that Gramsci’s concepts and theories are not suitable for the study 
of cultural policy and institutions  could be ascribed to the new forms of anti-Marxist 14
prejudice that have characterised the post-1989 intellectual climate, rather than directly 
to the Cold War legacy. While Gramsci’s reflections on the role of the cultural industries 
in modern culture have received increasing attention,  and his theory of hegemony has 15
constituted the theoretical framework for the historical study of the emergence and 
development of cultural markets in Europe (also considered in relation to state 
intervention and regulation),  Gramsci’s reflections on cultural policy have remained 16
neglected.  
The only scholar to have given any attention to Gramsci’s use of the expression 
‘politica culturale’ (‘cultural policy’) is Wolfgang Fritz Haug. However, he has argued 
that with this concpet Gramsci did not refer to what we today consider cultural policy in 
the sense of the activities of a cultural minister or of state funding of culture (in German 
‘Kulturpolitik’). To make sense of Gramsci’s expression, Haug has in fact coined the 
phrase Politik des Kulturellen (which can be translated as ‘politics of the cultural’), 
referring to the political dimension of culture,  or, in Birgit Wagner’s reading, to a 17
strategic view of the political dimension of the cultural field, or to culture as the 
multiplication of the modes of expression of the political.   18
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In this article, I qualify Haug’s claim by arguing that the expression politica 
culturale in Gramsci’s prison notebooks did in fact mean ‘cultural policy’. Although the 
concept had a broader meaning than the one normally ascribed to cultural policy as a 
governmental activity in today’s cultural policy studies, Gramsci’s concept was 
nonetheless more specific than Haug’s ‘Politik des Kulturellen’, and, as part of the 
theory of the integral state,  did also refer to the activities of a cultural minister and to 19
initiatives of state funding and more general state intervention in the cultural sphere. 
To demonstrate my point we first need to look at the particular way in which 
Gramsci resumed and developed, in his prison writings, the concept of culture and his 
interest in cultural institutions, which, as we have seen in Part Two, was prominent in 
his early political practice and writings. The tracing of this conceptual development is in 
fact essential for understanding Gramsci’s prison notes on cultural policy.  
Culture in the prison notebooks 
It was only in January 1934 that Gramsci eventually consigned to his prison 
notes a first full definition of culture, which he then perfected in a second draft between 
February and August 1934 at the very beginning of his special Notebook 23 on ‘Literary 
criticism’ – interestingly, the same notebook in which, as we will see, he went on to 
elaborate his concept of cultural policy.  It was inevitably a condensed definition, 20
which encapsulated all his earlier and contemporary reflections on culture, and 
explained how culture should be understood in the context of the theory of hegemony 
and of the integral state. Culture was in fact defined here as ‘a coherent, integral and 
nationwide “conception of life and man”, a “lay religion”, a philosophy that has become 
“culture”, that is, one that has generated an ethic, a life-style and an individual and civil 
pattern of behaviour’.  Like his earlier definition, this later one had both an analytical 21
and a normative character, as it also expressed how culture should be conceptualised in 
order to function in practice to contribute to political objectives.  
Whereas the earlier definition was focused on individual self-knowledge,  the 22
definition of culture formulated in this note shifted towards the collective, national 
dimension and no longer referred specifically to the proletariat, thus reflecting a shift in 
strategy from the earlier focus on the industrial working class as the privileged subject 
of revolution to the ‘popular classes’ or ‘popular masses’ of the whole nation. As a basis 
for his own definition, in fact, Gramsci referred to the concept of ‘political culture’ 
articulated by the nineteenth-century Italian literary critic Francesco De Sanctis, which 
had a national and mass dimension: it was only through the creation of a new unified 
national culture to be diffused amongst all social strata, that Italians could become, for 
De Sanctis, truly active politically. The creation of this new national culture was the 
responsibility of intellectuals, who should not remain isolated from society but should 
participate in its struggles.  Gramsci underlined the shift towards the national and mass 23
dimension explicitly by adding that this understanding of culture ‘required a new 
attitude towards the popular classes and a new concept of what is “national”, different 
from that of the Right, broader, less exclusive and, so to speak, less “police-like”’.  24
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That culture was ‘nationwide’ also meant that it was expressed in the national language 
and that the whole of the nation was involved in its elaboration and fruition (whereas 
folklore, for example, was local-provincial, expressed in a dialect,  and of little or no 25
use, for the national masses, for the task of creating a new culture and mobilising 
politically).  26
Culture was a ‘conception of life and man’ in the sense that it was not merely a 
conception of art and literature,  but was involved in the creation of a whole new 27
civilisation. It was a ‘lay religion’, where the emphasis was on ‘lay’, arguably in the 
sense of ‘a lay culture, (...) a modern “humanism” able to reach right to the simplest and 
most uneducated classes’.  It was ‘coherent’, arguably in the sense that it was organised 28
by organic intellectuals (whereas existing popular culture, or folklore, was ‘not 
elaborated and systematic’ but a ‘confused agglomerate of fragments’ of conceptions of 
the world and could not be ‘politically organised’).  It was also ‘integral’, possibly 29
because, against idealist notions of culture, it implied a complex relationship between 
civil society and political society in the context of the integral state, whereas Croce’s 
conception of culture implied its separation from politics and society (based on the 
separation of civil society from the state understood in the traditional sense as 
government -- in Gramsci’s terminology, ‘political society’), and Gentile’s conception 
implied the lack of a distinct civil society and its subsumption by political society.   30
Culture was therefore ‘a philosophy that (...) has generated an ethic, a life-style 
and an individual and civil pattern of behaviour’, where another novelty with respect to 
the pre-prison writings was thus also in the expression ‘civil behaviour’ (‘condotta 
civile’): it was only by generating a ‘civil behaviour’ as opposed to an individual one, 
that a new culture had the potential of becoming hegemonic. It is thus possible to say 
that Gramsci’s definition of culture referred to the development of a mass culture with 
particular characteristics as the necessary basis for the realisation of the revolutionary 
process and, after the achievement of state power, for the realisation of a full new 
culture, a full civil society, and a full hegemony. 
But when, how, and by whom was the development of such new culture 
undertaken? It was possible, for an emerging fundamental social group,  to start 31
creating a new conception of the world, establishing its alternative organisations and 
institutions in civil society (including cultural ones), and building some degree of 
alternative hegemony before the achievement of state power. For a successful 
‘supremacy’ it was actually necessary to ‘exercise [moral and intellectual] 
leadership’ (i.e., hegemony) of some degree before the achievement of state power.  It 32
was however the creation of the new state that made it possible for an emerging social 
group fully to develop its new conception of the world (i.e. a new culture), consolidate 
its institutions, and build a full hegemony, while at the same time creating a new social 
structure by upgrading the previously existing one to the production needs of the new 
state.   33
The creation of a new culture of an emerging social group was facilitated by the 
work of organic intellectuals, who could intervene on the basis of an analysis of the 
‘situation’ or ‘relations of force’.  Presumably, they could do very little at the level of 34
the relation of social forces, which was ‘closely linked to the structure, objective, 
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independent of human will’.  It was in fact ‘a refractory reality: nobody can alter the 35
number of firms or their employees, the number of cities or their given population, 
etc.’.  For Gramsci, however, the structure (i.e. the ‘refractory reality’) was not only 36
economic but also cultural, involving, for example, questions of race and religion.  37
These were relatively intractable cultural entities, which, presumably, could only really 
change with the achievement of a full new hegemony. 
Conceivably, the first significant stage of intervention of the organic intellectuals 
of an emerging social group was in facilitating the movement of the group from one 
level to the other within the relation of political forces, which expressed ‘the degree of 
homogeneity, self-awareness, and organisation attained by the various social classes’.  38
This movement marked ‘the decisive passage from the structure to the sphere of the 
complex superstructures’,  to reach the purely political level, in which one’s own 39
interests ‘transcend the corporate limits of the purely economic class, and can and must 
become the interests of other subordinate groups too’.  This was presumably the 40
moment for the establishment of autonomous cultural institutions of the emerging social 
group as well as for the elaboration of cultural tactics and strategies, particularly the 
intellectual and moral reform as a long-term cultural strategy. 
The other significant stage of intervention of organic intellectuals was, arguably, 
after the moment of the ‘relation of military forces’,  or the takeover of the state by the 41
emerging social group. It was presumably at this stage that the cultural organisations 
and institutions created by the emerging social group before the achievement of state 
power became the cultural institutions of the integral state. After the takeover, initially 
there would be a concentration of the new state on the reorganisation of the structure, 
while ‘the superstructural elements will inevitably be few in number, and have a 
character of foresight and of struggle, but as yet few “planned” elements’.  At this 42
stage, the cultural plan ‘will above all be negative, a critique of the past; it will be aimed 
at erasing from the memory and at destroying’,  thus arguably in a Proletkultist 43
manner.  ‘The lines of construction will as yet be “broad lines”, sketches, which might 44
(and should) be changed at all times, so as to be consistent with the new structure as it is 
formed’.  This passage clearly implied that at a later stage, after the takeover of state 45
power, there would be a more constructive cultural plan, with more ‘planned’ elements, 
to complete and consolidate the creation of the new culture -- although in terms of 
specific contents the planned elements would have to follow the development of the 
structure of society, and could therefore not be defined in advance. 
In the two sections that follow, I suggest that by cultural policy Gramsci 
understood the whole of the role of culture in these two stages of the relations of force. 
This included cultural strategies, tactics, policies, and plans undertaken by organic 
intellectuals through cultural institutions and the state. 
‘Graveyards of culture’ or ‘intellectual public services’: the role of cultural 
institutions 
In the prison notebooks, Gramsci’s earlier discussion of cultural institutions was 
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initially resumed implicitly as part of the discussion of the concept of ‘hegemonic 
apparatus’ of the hegemonic group,  and later explicitly in the form of the analysis of 46
cultural institutions in ‘modern society’.  Arguably, Gramsci used the notion of 47
‘modern society’ without any further specification to mean both bourgeois and socialist 
society, and therefore with general validity. However, a correction that he made to a 
note of June-July 1930 shows that the explicit normative discussion of the cultural 
institutions of the proletariat that had characterised his early writings was still in 
Gramsci’s mind in the summer of 1930 (combined with the discussion of the hegemonic 
apparatus of the bourgeoisie). After a false start, in fact, Gramsci crossed out the title 
(‘Riviste tipo’, ‘Types of periodicals’) and replaced it with a general one (‘Argomenti di 
cultura. Materiale ideologico’, ‘Cultural topics. Ideological material’). The note 
advanced the idea of undertaking a study of ‘how in actual fact the ideological structure 
of a dominant class is organised’, of ‘the material organisation intended to maintain, 
defend and develop the theoretical and ideological “front”’.  Yet this idea had been 48
initially jotted down by Gramsci as part of a normative note on the organisation of a 
periodical of the proletariat, outlining the task, for a member of the editorial staff, of 
mapping and assessing the periodicals of the competing bourgeois ideological front.  
The quantitatively biggest and most dynamic part is printed matter in general: publishing 
houses (which either explicitly or implicitly have a programme and are linked to a given 
tendency), political newspapers, journals of all sorts -- scientific, literary, philological and 
so on, periodicals down as far as the parish newsletter. Such a study made on the national 
scale would be gargantuan, so a series of studies could be carried out for a city or a series of 
cities. An expert local staff writer should have this study as a general outline for his work, 
or should rather do it on his own initiative: what superb articles could be written on these 
cities on this subject! 
The printed word is the most dynamic part of this ideological structure, but not the only 
one. Everything that influences or may influence public opinion directly or indirectly 
belongs to it: libraries, schools, groups and clubs of different kinds, right up to architecture, 
street lay-out and street names. One would not be able to explain the position the Church 
has maintained in modern society if one were not aware of its continuous patient and 
persistent efforts to develop its particular section of this material structure of ideology.          49
The rest of the note shows even more clearly that Gramsci was still intent on a 
normative reflection on the cultural institutions of the proletariat. In fact, he resumed a 
key argument of his youth about the Sorelian spirit of cleavage that should make the 
proletariat autonomous from bourgeois cultural hegemony, and linked it to the need to 
perform a strategic analysis of the ideological front of the bourgeoisie. 
There would be a certain importance in making a serious study of this. As well as providing 
a living historical model of this type of structure, it would get people into the habit of a 
more cautious and precise calculation of the forces acting in society. What can an 
innovatory class oppose to this formidable complex of trenches and fortifications of the 
dominant class? The spirit of cleavage, in other words the progressive acquisition of the 
consciousness of its own historical personality, a spirit of cleavage that must aim at an 
extension from the protagonist class to the potential allied classes.  50
More specifically, the mapping and assessment of the hegemonic apparatus was 
necessary because the first condition of the development of the autonomy was that the 
enemy camp of bourgeois hegemony had to be ‘emptied of its human mass element’.  51
 6
Eroding the hegemony of the bourgeoisie and depriving it of the consensus of the 
proletarian masses was therefore a preliminary step for the construction of the 
intellectual and moral autonomy of the proletariat as a condition for its full hegemony.   52
In another note of the late summer of 1930 we still find a discussion of the 
cultural institutions of the proletariat, but this time in the form of an analysis of existing 
‘traditional’ cultural institutions of the working classes within bourgeois society. It was 
in fact a reflection on ‘the origins and development’ of the system of popular public 
libraries that had been set up in Milan by the first leftist city government in 1903-4. The 
system was described by Gramsci as an ‘institution which has been the most remarkable 
initiative for popular culture in modern times’,  and an example, in Italy, of 53
‘unquestionable organizational ability in the field of workers’ culture, in a democratic 
sense’,  i.e. in a hegemonic context.   At the time in which Gramsci was writing this 54 55
note, an important political factor influenced his research agenda. Having started to 
disagree substantially with the Communist International’s assessment of fascism in 
1928-29, Gramsci was developing theoretically his idea of the preliminary need to 
overthrow Italian fascism and undertake a phase of democratic (hegemonic) struggle, a 
long transitional period of war of position within bourgeois society, before any thought 
of revolution could be entertained, to avoid a complete self-annihilation of the working 
class after the massive coercive reorganisation of the fascist state.  This was therefore 56
the political background for his third distinct line of inquiry into the traditional cultural 
institutions of the working classes (institutions that Gramsci had criticised and written 
off in his youth), to investigate their potential role in the tactical perspective of a long 
hegemonic struggle dictated by the exceptional coercive character of the fascist regime.  
An important point of the discussion of the system of Milanese libraries was the 
uniqueness of that experiment in Italy, and the fact that it was already at least twenty-
five years old at the time in which Gramsci was writing his note, thus offering a rare 
chance of studying and assessing a concrete socialist reformist cultural institution 
empirically. Having read an account of the system, Gramsci jotted down what he saw as 
the most interesting data: 
the workers were the best ‘clients’ of the public libraries: they took care of the books, they 
did not lose them (unlike other kinds of readers: students, white-collar workers, 
professionals, housewives, the well-off (?), etc.); readers of “belletristic” literature 
represented a relatively low percentage, fewer than in other countries; workers who offered 
to pay half the cost of expensive books if only they could read them; workers who made 
donations of up to one hundred lire to the public libraries; a dye worker who has become a 
‘writer’ and a translator from the French through his reading and studies in the public 
libraries, but who continues to be a worker.  57
Gramsci also considered the availability of data about the popular reading public as a 
source of information about popular reading taste beyond the data that could be 
obtained indirectly by analysing the choices made by the publishing industry: he was 
interested in what was actually read, beyond what was published. ‘The literature on the 
public libraries in Milan should be studied to obtain some ‘real’ ideas about popular 
culture: which kinds of books and authors are read most, etc.’.  Special publications of 58
the library system were also, for Gramsci, important sources of policy information on 
the character of the libraries, their cultural-intellectual ‘tendencies’, and their objectives 
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in political terms as organisations linked to the Milanese tradition of Socialist 
reformism.  The very existence of popular public libraries in certain cities rather than in 59
others also generated broader social-political questions: ‘Why is this kind of initiative 
on a grand scale only in Milan? Why not in Turin and other large cities? The nature and 
history of Milanese ‘reformism’; Popular University, etc. A very interesting and 
fundamental topic’.  60
The idea of mapping and assessing the hegemonic apparatus was resumed by 
Gramsci with a new emphasis in 1932, when he established detailed criteria for such a 
task, also indicating that cultural institutions should be studied and assessed in the 
context of a more general empirical study of the whole system of cultural organisation 
at the national level, rather than just at city level as he had previously written.  ‘It 61
would be interesting to study concretely the forms of cultural organisation which keep 
the ideological world in movement within a given country, and to examine how they 
function in practice’.  It was the same shift to the national dimension which, as we have 62
seen, was reflected in his definition of culture, which he first drafted at around the same 
time. Such a nation-wide study would consist of a strategic quantitative mapping of the 
relations of force in the different aspects of the cultural sphere.  
A study of the numerical relationship between the section of the population professionally 
engaged in active cultural work in the country in question and the population as a whole, 
would also be useful, together with an approximate calculation of the unattached forces 
[‘forze libere’].   63
Cultural organisations and institutions, especially schools and the Church were 
fundamental elements to be considered in such strategic analysis of the relations of 
force because of the sheer number of intellectuals who were involved in their activities.  
The school, at all levels, and the Church, are the biggest cultural organisations in every 
country, in terms of the number of people they employ. Then there are newspapers, 
magazines and the book trade and private educational institutions, either those which are 
complementary to the state system, or cultural institutions like the Popular Universities.   64
The analysis should be extended beyond the cultural sphere strictly understood because 
all human beings conducted some degree of cultural activity, and in particular there 
were sections of civil society that implied a high degree of intellectual activity, 
particularly in terms of the organisation of social life: ‘[o]ther professions include 
among their specialised activities a fair proportion of cultural activity. For example, 
doctors, army officers, the legal profession’.   65
A key element of the hegemonic apparatus to consider in terms of relations of 
force was the distance between the intellectual groups and the popular masses, which 
should be the object of specific analysis and assessment. Presumably, the distance 
between the intellectual groups and the popular masses was important for Gramsci not 
only as a warning for the construction of the hegemony of the proletariat, but also as an 
indicator of the possible weakness of the existing hegemonic apparatus of the 
bourgeoisie. It was therefore a general criterion, and this is further confirmed by a 
reference to ‘all countries’. 
But it should be noted that in all countries, though in differing degrees, there is a great gap 
 8
between the popular masses and the intellectual groups, even the largest ones, and those 
nearest to the peripheries of national life, like priests and school teachers. The reason for 
this is that, however the ruling class may affirm to the contrary, the State, as such, does not 
have a unitary, coherent and homogeneous conception, with the result that intellectual 
groups are scattered between one stratum and the next, or even within a single stratum. The 
Universities, except in a few countries, do not exercise any unifying influence: often an 
independent thinker has more influence than the whole of [the] university institutions, etc.  66
In a note of February 1933, another indicator of the strength of the hegemonic apparatus 
was identified by Gramsci in the fact that in a ‘modern society’ certain kinds of cultural 
institutions that were important for public education and culture should be supported by 
the state or by local authorities; if left to ‘private’, individual business initiative they 
would not be equally accessible to all social groups;  this would create a distance 67
between intellectuals and the masses and therefore a weakness in the hegemonic 
apparatus. 
Public intellectual services: over and above schooling at its various levels, what other 
services cannot be left to private initiative, but in a modern society must be ensured by the 
state and local authorities (town councils and provinces)? The theatre, libraries and 
museums of different types, the art galleries, zoological and botanical gardens, etc. A list 
should be made of institutions which are to be considered useful for public education and 
culture and which are indeed considered such in a series of nations, institutions which could 
not be accessible to the public (and which it is maintained must, for national reasons, be 
accessible) without intervention by the state.    68
A comparison amongst modern nations was also useful in assessing the relative 
weakness of the hegemonic apparatus of a particular country. Gramsci in fact noted that 
cultural institutions were already considered useful for public education and culture ‘in 
a series of nations’, while in Italy they were elite business organisations.  
It may be observed that it is just these services that are almost completely neglected by us, 
the libraries and theatres being typical examples. The theatres exist in so far as they are a 
business undertaking – they are not considered a public service.   69
This was presumably to be considered an indication that cultural institutions in Italy 
were a weak element of the hegemonic apparatus: because of the way in which they 
were conceived, they were unable to attract the ‘element of human mass’; their role was 
perhaps limited to the restricted hegemony over allied classes. The fact that charitable 
cultural institutions replaced public cultural institutions did not improve the situation 
because they were badly administered and were also run as private businesses, rather 
than as public services, and functioned according to a paternalistic logic. Gramsci 
seemed here to imply that, even in large numbers, paternalistic initiatives did not 
replace public cultural institutions in terms of contributing to the strength of the 
hegemonic apparatus. ‘These elements [are] to be studied as national nexuses between 
governors and governed, as factors of hegemony. Charity as element of ‘paternalism’; 
intellectual services as elements of hegemony, in other words of democracy in the 
modern sense’.  It was therefore important to study existing cultural institutions in 70
terms of power relationships in the light of the fundamental distinction between 
paternalism and hegemony. 
This note and the previous one should be seen as having general analytical 
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validity because although Gramsci discussed the specific example of Italian bourgeois 
society, it is possible to extract a general normative principle of how cultural institutions 
should be organised in terms of the theory of hegemony.  The specific normative 71
discussion of the development of proletarian hegemony was therefore not resumed by 
Gramsci as part of his reflection on cultural institutions but in the context of the 
discussion of two different themes: ‘journalism’ and, as we will see, ‘cultural policy’ -- 
the latter being of interest here.  72
Cultural policy 
The concept of cultural policy first appeared in Gramsci’s prison work in a note drafted 
in November 1932, which Gramsci later included in second draft in the special 
Notebook 23 on ‘Literary criticism’. In this note, he related the concept of ‘politica 
culturale’ to the development of a new culture (‘cultural creation’) conceived as a 
political activity.  This clearly means that the discussion of issues of cultural policy was 73
first of all part of the question of the development of the new culture of the proletariat. 
However, as we will see, it did not remain confined to this specific context but was 
subject to generalisation.  
Gramsci addressed the question of the creation of a new culture by resorting to 
the concept of ‘neolalismo’, by which he meant ‘a pathological expression of individual 
language (vocabulary)’,  i.e., a language disorder that is apparently characteristic of 74
paranoid dementia, by which neologisms prevail over the words of the common 
language. He asked whether the concept could be used ‘in a more general sense, to 
indicate a whole series of cultural, artistic and intellectual manifestations’. Arguably, he 
was trying to establish an analogy between the process of creation of new words by a 
person affected by dementia and the process of creation of new cultural, artistic and 
literary expressions. Just as the person affected by a particular psychiatric illness created 
new words, in the same way ‘the most extensive and multifarious cases of neolalismo 
arise in periods of crisis’.  This was therefore an implicit reference to yet another 75
indicator of the weakness of the hegemonic apparatus of the bourgeoisie: the 
proliferation of literary and artistic schools. This was possibly a sign that there had been 
a loss of coherence in the existing hegemonic worldview, and therefore that there was 
the possibility, for a new alternative hegemony, to emerge. Thus in the same way in 
which a particular mental illness opened the way to the creation of new words, a crisis 
in the bourgeois hegemony also opened the way to the creation of a new culture of the 
proletariat.   76
But why was cultural policy related to the creation of a new culture? 
Consistently with Gramsci’s view of social change, the creation of a new culture did not 
happen spontaneously; on the contrary, it required a broad struggle: ‘[o]ne must speak 
of a struggle for a new culture, that is, for a new moral life that cannot but be intimately 
connected to a new intuition of life, until it becomes a new way of feeling and seeing 
reality’.  Arguably, cultural policy was seen by Gramsci as connected with such 77
struggle.  
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Gramsci also used the concept of ‘politica di cultura’ (‘politics of culture’) with 
a meaning similar to cultural policy but seemingly restricted to the normative element 
(i.e., cultural policy-making), suggesting that for establishing, organising a politica di 
cultura it was indispensable to analyse cultural creation in terms of historical 
stratification of modes of communication.  The stratified modes of communication 78
ranged from the ‘provincial-dialect-folklore grade’, to the ‘national popular’, to the 
grade of civilisation (expressed in religion and, in the modern world, in political 
currents), and, in the case of the arts, to ‘the cosmopolitan expression of musical, 
pictorial and other types of language’.  This analysis, Gramsci specified, was even 79
fundamental for establishing and organising a politica di cultura of the popular 
masses’.  We can see that while the discussion of cultural institutions remained 80
analytical and general, in the discussion of the normative element of cultural policy 
Gramsci also referred specifically to the case of the proletariat. However, at the same 
time he did not limit his reflection to this specific case because the analysis of the 
stratification of modes of communication was ‘indispensable’ in any case, i.e., in 
general. This means that from this fragment Gramsci extracted a general criterion about 
politica di cultura, or the normative element of cultural policy. 
 Arguably, the analysis of cultural stratification was fundamental because 
hegemony should be achieved at the national level: it should have national-popular 
character and scope. Hegemony of a local-provincial character and scope was clearly 
not sufficient. Linked to this issue was Gramsci’s preoccupation with the question of the 
consolidation of a common national language, shared by the national popular masses, as 
a condition of the achievement of their full hegemony -- hence his indication that ‘the 
new literature must necessarily manifest itself “nationally”, in relatively hybrid and 
different combinations and alloys’.   81
An example of a phenomenon in Italian cultural history that for Gramsci should 
be considered and analysed as an early act of ‘politica culturale-nazionale’ (‘national-
cultural policy’), and therefore related to the creation of a new national culture in 
relation to a new hegemony, was Dante’s treatise De Vulgari Eloquentia.  In 82
thistreatise, written at the beginning of the fourteenth century, when most Italian writers 
still preferred to write their works in Latin, Dante compared Latin with vernacular 
Italian, arguing that the vernacular was nobler because it was a natural and living 
language, while Latin had been rendered artificial and inexpressive by its exclusively 
scholastic use. For Gramsci, because ‘what is called the “question of language” has 
always been an aspect of the political struggle’,  Dante’s essay amounted to an explicit 83
act of national-cultural policy which exemplified the development of language as part of 
the process of creation of a new culture, and ultimately the creation of a whole new 
civilisation by an emerging class as a form of political struggle.  Cultural policy was 84
thus an active hegemonic struggle undertaken by the organic intellectuals of an 
emerging social group. ‘Language is transformed with the transformation of the whole 
of civilisation, through the acquisition of culture by new classes and through the 
hegemony exercised by one national language over others’.  The cyclical re-surfacing 85
of the ‘question of language’ in Italy was in fact for Gramsci a symptom of intensified 
political struggle and of hegemonic readjustment and consolidation:  
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[e]very time the question of language surfaces, in one way or another, it means that a series 
of other problems are coming to the fore: the formation and enlargement of the governing 
class, the need to establish more intimate and secure relationships between the governing 
groups and the national-popular mass, in other words to reorganize the cultural 
hegemony.   86
For Gramsci, Dante’s essay also showed the poet’s tactical awareness of the fact that 
artistic achievements could function as legitimisation of the prestige of a new language, 
favouring its emergence as a hegemonic language: ‘the Italian intellectuals of the most 
thriving period of the communes “broke” with Latin and justified the vernacular by 
raising it up against Latinizing “mandarinism”, in the same period in which the 
vernacular had such great artistic expressions’.  Something similar could be seen to 87
happen in the more general case of the creation of a new culture: artistic achievements 
could always function as legitimisation of a new culture. This general principle could 
therefore also be applied to the case of the proletariat of Gramsci’s time. If popular 
literature could produce prestigious artistic achievements, such achievements would 
contribute to legitimising the new culture as hegemonic.  
But how could the working classes concretely achieve such an objective? How 
could a new popular literature be created organically, i.e. without it being engineered? It 
seems that for Gramsci the organic creation of a new culture could at least be 
accelerated.  It is possible to argue that this acceleration was a key task of cultural 88
plans that were part of the broader process of cultural policy-making.  89
Gramsci saw in the analogy with architecture the possibility of extracting the 
general principles that could be applied to such acceleration. In the early 1930s, at the 
time of the debate on rationalist architecture in the Italian press, Gramsci wrote that ‘the 
concept of rationalism or “functionalism” in architecture’ seemed to be ‘rich in 
consequences and principles’  for politica culturale (‘cultural policy’),  arguably in the 90 91
sense of understanding how a new culture could be created.  
By the time Gramsci wrote this note (February 1933) architectural rationalism, 
which had previously been ostracised by Italian conservative critics, was widely 
acclaimed by the fascist regime. Gramsci noted that rationalism in architecture was 
consistent with the broader changes in the organisation of the state that were common to 
all advanced capitalist nations: ‘[i]t is no accident that the concept arose in the present 
period of “socialization” (in the broad sense) and of attempts by central forces to 
organize the great masses against the remnants of individualism and the aesthetics of 
individualism in politica culturale’.  He therefore explored the question of whether the 92
phenomenon of rationalist architecture could be taken to correspond to a conception of 
‘literature based on a plan or on a pre-established social course, in other words, 
“functional” literature’.   93
Given that functionalist-rationalist architecture was being used to build housing 
for the popular masses, Gramsci asked the question of why critics found it so easy to 
accept rationalism in architecture on the ground that architecture was a practical art that 
responded to a social need of vast popular masses, while there was no perception of the 
other arts and literature as generating an equivalent social need; on the contrary, ‘the 
 12
products of the other arts are necessary only for intellectuals, for the cultured’,  and 94
precisely because there was no such perception, the notion of a literature according to a 
plan was typically rejected by critics as a form of ‘social coercion’.  To Gramsci’s 95
mind, criticism of the idea of a functional literature responding to a mass social need 
was typically expressed by ‘traditional and traditionalist intellectuals who are prepared, 
at most, to concede that innovations can be brought in little by little, gradually’,  as 96
they felt threatened by functionalism and preferred the decorative arts. For Gramsci, the 
point was not whether a functionalist literature responding to a social plan, a social need 
of the masses, should be considered ‘coercion’ for the writers, but rather whether 
rationalism in literature could respond to an ‘authentic’, a ‘real’ functionalism simply 
‘obtained by an accelerated method’,  or whether this would amount to an external 97
imposition. In fact, even in the case of general industrial production he argued that the 
state should not ‘accelerate, through coercion imposed from outside, the growth of 
discipline and order in production’,  and presumably this held true also for cultural 98
production.  
In his discussion of the analogy between literature and architecture, Gramsci 
was highly polemical on questions of ‘social coercion’ in the cultural sphere.  99
Presumably this polemic referred to the criticism, by Italian critics, of the Soviet 
attempts to develop a new literature according to centralised planning. The implication 
of Gramsci’s polemic seems to be that the reason why cultural policy in fascist Italy did 
not give art a ‘plan’ responding to broad social needs was that unlike in the Soviet 
Union, art literature had remained largely a preserve of the elites and was detached from 
the people-nation despite the regime’s populism and nationalism. Gramsci in fact went 
on to ask whether what tended to be considered by critics as ‘coercion’ in relation to 
artistic plans had in reality always existed historically, at least in forms exercised 
unconsciously, as a form of ‘rationalism’ against individual will.   100
In any case, Gramsci regarded functionalist architecture as an adequate model 
for a functional, collective, accessible literature: ‘architecture, in itself and through its 
(immediate) connections with the rest of life, seems to be the most reformable and 
“disputable” of the arts’.  It ‘is “collective” not only as an “occupation” but also in 101
terms of “judgement”.  He therefore opposed the opinion that architecture should be 102
considered an industrial product and therefore non-art. ‘When art, especially in its 
collective forms, aims to create a mass taste, to elevate this taste, it is not “industrial”, 
but disinterested: i.e. it is art’.   103
The idea of accelerating the development of an authentic rationalism-
functionalism in literature through the organisation of cultural plans also made it 
possible, for Gramsci, to look at innovation, novelty and originality in a new way, 
leaving behind the Romantic view of the innovator as someone involved in creative 
destruction, as ‘someone who wants to destroy everything that exists, without worrying 
about what will happen afterwards since one already knows that in a metaphysical sense 
every destruction is creation, indeed one only destroys what is then replaced by a new 
creation’.  Gramsci thus stressed that originality in the development of a new popular 104
literature should be seen not as mere opposition to repetition, but as authenticity in 
relation to a function.  
 13
In a note titled ‘Governi e livelli culturali nazionali’ (‘Governments and national 
cultural standards’),  Gramsci also sketched some criteria for the assessment of the 105
‘politica culturale’ (‘cultural policy’) of existing governments. These were general 
criteria valid for both bourgeois and socialist society because he did not indicate a 
specific context for their application. 
Every government has a cultural policy that it can defend from its own point of view, 
demonstrating that it has raised the country’s cultural standards. It all depends on how this 
standard is measured. A government might improve the organization of high culture and 
downgrade popular culture. Furthermore, within the sphere of high culture, a government 
might choose to improve the organization of the sector concerned with technology and the 
natural sciences by paternalistically providing that sector with funds that were not 
previously made available to it, etc.  106
The only criterion for establishing whether the government had truly raised the 
country’s cultural standards was by assessing whether its cultural policy was 
‘repressive’ (which for Gramsci meant top-down and disjointed from the popular 
masses) or ‘expansive’ (which meant bottom-up and involving the whole mass of the 
population).  
There is only one criterion of judgement: is the system of government repressive or 
expansive? And this criterion can be articulated even more precisely: is a government 
repressive in certain respects while it is expansive in other respects? A system of 
government is expansive when it facilitates and promotes growth from the bottom upward, 
when it raises the level of national-popular culture and thus enables the emergence of a 
variety of ‘intellectual heights’ across a more extensive area. A desert with a cluster of tall 
plants is still a desert; indeed, it is characteristic of a desert to have small oases with 
clusters of tall palms.  107
Gramsci’s specification that in this note he was discussing the cultural policy of 
governments further confirms that for him cultural policy should also be understood, in 
a restricted sense, as an activity carried out by governments, i.e. an activity located in 
political society, while the concept of cultural policy without further specification 
should be understood as broader than governmental activity.  Cultural policy in the 108
modern integral state was in fact not restricted to governmental activity but was 
extended to civil society, it was also part of the hegemonic struggle within civil 
society.  It is in fact possible to argue that in a Gramscian scheme it was only in the 109
Fascist theory of the state, which did not contemplate a separate civil society but 
subsumed it under the state-as-government,  that cultural policy could be 110
conceptualised as the exclusive activity of political society. On the other hand, in 
Gramsci’s theory of the socialist state cultural policy would remain, after the gradual 
withering away of the state-as-government, an exclusive activity of civil society. In any 
case, from the analytical point of view, within the perimeter of the theory of the integral 




Cultural policy in Gramsci’s prison notebooks was referred to ‘modern’ societies, i.e, 
societies run by hegemonic means through an integral state, and included both 
analytical and normative questions. It was in fact an umbrella concept to refer to the 
active, coherent work of organisation carried out by organic intellectuals to favour the 
development of a new hegemonic culture both before and after the achievement of state 
power by an emerging social group. It included questions of cultural strategy such as the 
establishment of autonomous cultural institutions of an emerging social group, the 
elaboration of the intellectual and moral reform, the national-popular character of 
culture or the need to involve the popular masses; questions of cultural tactics such as 
Dante’s legitimation of the vernacular language; questions of cultural policy-making 
and of long-term cultural plans by the state such as the development of a popular 
literature according to rationalist-functionalist criteria. Gramsci’s concept of cultural 
policy had the character of a general theory because it referred not just to a specific 
social context but, in a general sense, to any ‘modern’ society characterised by a 
significant level of reciprocal interaction between the state and civil society. 
For us today, thinking about cultural policy through a Gramscian lens means 
thinking in terms of relationships between political society and civil society within the 
theoretical perimeter of the integral state. Governments intervene in civil society to 
regulate and fund cultural practices and activities, but at the same time governmental 
cultural policy is not isolated from the interests that exist in civil society. For example, 
governmental cultural policy is rarely fully independent of religious questions, never 
really isolated from business interests, hardly free from interference from lobby groups 
in civil society. A Gramscian lens seems particularly relevant for analysing cultural 
policy in social contexts characterised by deep reciprocal links between civil society 
and political society -- as is typically the case of neoliberal societies, in which 
legislation and major policy decisions are often dictated by private organisations, lobby 
groups, and think tanks backed by private corporations, while massively interventionist 
states bail out companies and financial institutions.  111
As a general conclusion to my three-part essay, it is possible, on the basis of the 
analysis carried out, to provide a response to the claims of unsuitability of Gramsci’s 
concepts and theories to the study of cultural policy and institutions which have been 
made by the Australian ‘governmentality’ school of cultural policy studies. 
1) Gramsci’s theory of cultural policy is not based on the idea of culture as 
‘whole ways of life’; on the contrary, culture is defined in relation to politics. 
2) Existing popular culture is not legitimised in Gramsci’s writings as an object 
of ‘symbolic opposition to culture in its more restricted dominant and aesthetic form’; 
on the contrary, it is replaced with a new national-popular culture that will also develop 
its own aesthetic forms (as in the discussion of rationalist-functionalist popular 
literature). 
3) Gramsci’s theory of cultural policy is not based on the theory of hegemony in 
civil society, but on the broader theory of the integral state, which also includes political 
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society, i.e government. 
4) As a general theory valid for any modern state (capitalist or socialist) it does 
not focus exclusively on class conflict, but more generally on power dynamics amongst 
social groups (in fact classes are supposed to disappear in the socialist state); 
nonetheless, a focus on social class seems useful for an analysis of cultural policy in 
contemporary neoliberal societies, which tend to the concentration of wealth and the 
restoration of class power.  112
5) It does not assume an agency based on class, race and gender because the 
socialist society is based on the principle of equality amongst all human beings, without 
class and race division or gender exploitation.  
6) It does not conceive the organic intellectual as ‘unable to connect with policy-
makers’; on the contrary, the organic intellectual is a cultural policy-maker (as in the 
example of the poet Dante Alighieri). 
7) It does not rely on ‘signifying or discursive means’ but on the analysis of the 
‘relations of force’.  
8) It does not ignore ‘institutional conditions’ which ‘regulate different fields of 
culture’; on the contrary, in Gramsci cultural institutions are central to both analytical 
and normative questions of cultural strategy, tactics, policy-making, and plans -- and it 
is actually possible to say that cultural institutions are probably more central in Gramsci 
than in most other cultural and political theorists. 
9) It does not ignore ‘forms of social life and conduct’, but instead of being 
generated by ‘history’ as Bennett would expect, these are generated by the requirements 
of the modes of production, and are delivered by the hegemonic element of the integral 
state. The cultural policy of governments is in fact likely to be involved in upgrading 
the cultural level of the population to the needs of the mode of production. Gramsci’s 
analysis of Americanism and Fordism was precisely about the generation of forms of 
social life and conduct -- not generated directly by the mode of production itself, but by 
the pursuit, by the state, of a particular social philosophy to which the contribution of 
industrialists was not extraneous and which was not independent of their interests: 
prohibition of alcohol and extreme puritanism in the sexual sphere were generated in 
workers for the sake of maximum productivity in the factory.  
Likewise, the neoliberal state surely does not keep its population at the cultural 
level needed for a mode of production of, say, 50 years ago. It generates it own specific 
forms of social life and conduct that are consistent with its particular modes of 
production and are inspired by neoliberal conceptions of the world -- for example, they 
will probably be based on ideas of individual freedom, individualism, flexibility, 
fatalism, narcissistic consumerism.  But what Gramsci also tells us is that the integral 113
state does not necessarily need to do this through measures introduced by the 
government; as long as civil society is able to produce and promote the new worldview 
effectively to a hegemonic dimension, the state will not need to intervene: as Gramsci 
explained, in the modern capitalist state force and consent are variously balanced, but 
there is never too much coercion when it is not needed.  114
 While the Australian ‘governmentality’ school of cultural policy studies seems 
to assume that cultural policy can only serve governmental purposes of social 
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reproduction (therefore implying that the social groups in power will necessarily remain 
in power), in Gramsci’s theory this is not necessarily the case, and in fact cultural policy 
has a role to play in the hegemonic struggle: it has to do with cultural creation as a 
political activity with a fundamental role in enabling the formation of a new culture, and 
therefore of a new hegemony of an emerging social group. Therefore, while the 
governmentality model is just descriptive, Gramsci’s theorisation of cultural policy is 
also normative; and although it assumes that the precise content of cultural policy 
cannot be predetermined in abstract terms but needs to be developed on the basis of the 
organic evolution of a society, Gramsci discusses the criteria that cultural policy-
making should follow if it is to contribute to the creation of a genuine hegemonic 
relationship.  
This latter point is closely linked to the question of the role of the organic 
intellectual. While in the governmentality model cultural policy is a matter of 
technocratic initiative, in Gramsci, as Anne Showstack Sassoon has rightly emphasised 
in the context of a more general discussion, ‘technocratic solutions of any sort (...) are 
bound to be inadequate before the enormously complex needs of society. The only way 
to “know” reality involves understanding popular feelings’.  Organic intellectuals thus 115
need to understand common sense in order to criticise it.  And therefore ‘[r]ather than 116
a populist glorification of the ideas of the people, Gramsci argues that it is in their 
practical activities and their feelings that the population provides problems for organic 
intellectuals to study and resolve’.   117
Because cultural policy was for Gramsci an aspect of the hegemonic struggle, it 
is clear that in his scheme a politically ‘neutral’ cultural policy undertaken by experts 
‘above’ politics in a technocratic-reformist fashion (as recommended by the 
governmentality model) was not a real, authentic possibility, but only an idealist cover 
up of what was in fact, necessarily, a political activity.  In fact, contrary to the 118
governmentality model, Gramsci’s theory of cultural policy does not hide the close 
relationship between culture and politics; on the contrary, it includes it as a key factor in 
both the analysis and the normative element. In the light of Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemonic apparatus and in the context of his theory of the integral state, civil society is 
not neutral or benign.  It is therefore not through the reformist participation in the 119
expansion of the existing civil society that an emerging social group can advance 
objectives of radical social change; on the contrary, by helping consolidate the existing 
hegemony it would make its own hegemonic struggle more difficult and lengthy. This 
clearly means that reformist cultural policy-making is ruled out as counterproductive by 
Gramsci’s theory of cultural policy. The emerging social group needs to develop its own 
autonomous cultural strategies, tactics, institutions, policy and plans aimed at the 
development of its new culture and hegemony. There is therefore no role for the 
intellectual as a technocrat. In the context of the hegemonic struggle, the intellectual 
needs to be ‘not only a scientist’ but ‘a partisan, a man of powerful passions, an active 
politician, who wishes to create a new balance of forces and therefore cannot help 
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traditionally understood as coercion. ‘In a doctrine of the State which conceives the latter as tendentially 
capable of withering away and of being subsumed into regulated society, the argument is a fundamental 
one. It is possible to imagine the coercive element of the State withering away by degrees, as ever-more 
conspicuous elements of regulated society (or ethical State or civil society) make their appearance’ (SPN 
263; Q 6, 88, 763-4). The integral state of advanced capitalism, however, made it possible for the 
proletariat to start a qualitative transformation of politics already in bourgeois society through the work of 
intellectuals and a range of working-class institutions, particularly the political party (Showstak Sassoon, 
Gramsci’s Politics, pp. 131-2).
 The term ‘special notebook’ is normally used to refer to Gramsci’s thematic notebooks, in which, from 20
1932, he started to systematise, in second draft, some of the notes he had previously written.
 CW 92 (Q 23, 1, 2185-6). The first draft of this note (Q 17, 38) lacked the adjective ‘integral’, which 21
only appeared in the second draft.
 In the pre-prison definition, discussed in Part Two, culture was ‘organization, discipline of one’s inner 22
self, a coming to terms with one’s own personality; (...) the attainment of a higher awareness, with the aid 
of which one succeeds in understanding one’s own historical value, one’s own function in life, one’s own 
rights and obligations’ (PW1 11; SP 18).
 F. De Sanctis, ‘La coltura politica’, L’Italia, 13 June 1877, reprinted in Scritti politici di Francesco De 23
Sanctis raccolti da Giuseppe Ferrarelli, 3rd ed. Napoli, Morano, 1900, pp. 70-74. In his essay, De Sanctis 
also clarified that the the creation of a new national culture was not the responsibility of a minister of 
education, but Gramsci did not pick up this point, arguably because, as we have seen in Part Two, he 
ascribed a fundamental role to the public education system.
 CW 92-3 (Q 23, 1, 2186). In CW, ‘Right’ is given as translation of Gramsci’s original ‘destra storica’, 24
which referred specifically to the political right in power in the sixteen years (1860-76) during which the 
Italian unification was realised.
 CW 123 (Q 23, 7, 2194).25
 From the perspective of today’s concept of multiculturalism the idea of a nationwide culture might be 26
considered questionable; however, Gramsci's emphasis was on overcoming the limitations of localism and 
provincialism, which could undermine mass political mobilisation.
 It does not seem just coincidental that Gramsci clarified, in the first note of this notebook, that 27
‘returning to De Sanctis’ did not mean ‘“to return” mechanically to those concepts on art and literature 
that De Sanctis developed’. CW 92 (Q 23, 1, 2185).
 CW 211 (Q 21, 5, 2119).28
 CW 189 (Q 27, 1, 2312).29
  SPN 271 (Q 6, 10, 691).30
 Gramsci’s discussion of the emerging social group clearly referred to the proletariat, but was expressed 31
in terms of a scheme valid in general, arguably beyond his time, for any fundamental social group.
 This was in fact part of the general theory of hegemony as enunciated by Gramsci in SPN 57-8 (Q 19, 32
24, 2010-11).
 See A.S. Sassoon, Gramsci's Politics, 2nd ed., Minneapolis, Unwin Hyman and University of 33
Minnesota Press, 1987 [1980], pp. 132-4, and 260-1.
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 The study of the ‘situation’ was, in Gramsci, the study of long-term, ‘organic’ social transformations 34
and was linked to questions of ‘strategy’ and ‘propaganda’ (whereas the study of the ‘conjuncture’ was the 
study of economic fluctuations and was linked to questions of ‘tactics’ and ‘agitation’). See SPN 177, 
note 79 (Q 6, 130, 797). For a detailed discussion of Gramsci’s analysis of the relations of force, see 
Buci-Glucksmann, C., Gramsci and the State, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1980 [1975], pp. 71-91, 
Sassoon, Gramsci's Politics, pp. 184-7, and G. Francioni, L’officina gramsciana, Bibliopolis, Napoli, 
1984, pp. 184-6.
 SPN 180 (Q 13, 17, 1583).35
 SPN 181 (Q 13, 17, 1583).36
 FS 424 (Q 17, 12, 1917).37
 SPN 181 (Q 13, 17, 1583). 38
 SPN 181 (Q 13, 17, 1584). 39
 Ibid.40
 SPN 183 (Q 13, 17, 1585).41
 SPN 263-4 (Q 8, 185, 1053). For a broader interpretation of this and the following passages, see 42
Sassoon, Gramsci's Politics, pp. 133-4.
 SPN 263-4 (Q 8, 185, 1053). In this note, SPN translates Gramsci’s original ‘piano culturale’ (‘cultural 43
plan’) as ‘cultural policy’. However, arguably ‘cultural plan’ should be understood as a particular element 
of cultural policy; as we will see, Gramsci used the expression ‘politica culturale’ (‘cultural policy’) to 
refer to a much broader phenomenon.
 See my discussion of Gramsci’s relationship with the Russian Proletkult movement in Part Two.44
 SPN 264 (Q 8, 185, 1053).45
 Christine Buci-Glucksmann has emphasised the fact, already highlighted by Althusser, that Gramsci 46
referred to cultural organisations and institutions as being part of the ‘hegemonic apparatus’ (Buci-
Glucksmann, C., Gramsci and the State, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1980 [1975], p. 48). More 
specifically, Gramsci used the concept of ‘hegemonic apparatus’ to mean the ‘cultural and intellectual 
organisation’ of the hegemonic group (FS 17; Q 6, 87, 763) or the prevailing organisations and political 
parties of the hegemonic group (SPN 264; Q 6, 136, 800). According to Gianni Francioni, however, the 
concept of hegemonic apparatus was later generalised by Gramsci as a consequence of his ‘theoretical 
turn’ in late 1930, when the problems of hegemony and of hegemonic apparatus became key elements 
within the theory of the integral state. Francioni, L’officina gramsciana.
 FS 153 (Q 14, 56, 1714-5). The concept of ‘modern society’ in the prison notebooks seems to refer, in a 47
general sense, to a society characterised by the existence of an hegemonic relationship: ‘of hegemony, in 
other words of democracy in the modern sense’. FS 154 (Q 14, 56, 1715). 
 FS 155-6 (Q 3, 49, 332-3) 48
 Ibid.49
 Ibid.50
 FS 155-6 (Q 3, 49, 332-3), my translation. In FS, Gramsci’s original verb ‘svuotare’ (to empty, to drain) 51
has been translated as ‘to clear’, which however seems to have a slightly different meaning, especially in 
the context of this note.
 Gramsci would later write of the need ‘to destroy one hegemony and create another as a necessary 52
moment of the overturning praxis’ (FS 395; Q 10-II, 41-XII, 1369).
 PN1 331 (Q 2, 88, 245).53
 Ibid.54
 Gramsci referred to hegemonic rule as ‘democracy in a modern sense’. FS 154 (Q 14, 56, 1715).55
 This tactic was put forward by Gramsci amongst his comrades in Turi’s prison under the slogan of a 56
struggle for a constituent assembly. See Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci and the state, where this tactic is 
analysed in the context of Gramsci’s critique of economism, pp. 237-290.
 PN1 331 (Q 2, 88, 245). The adjective ‘belletristic’ (‘belletristica’ in the original) referred to the French 57





 SPN 341-2 (Q 11, 12, 1394). Although the passage discussed here appears in a grouping of notes in 61
second draft, it is a new fragment that does not appear in earlier notes.
 Ibid., my emphasis.62




 FS 153 (Q 14, 56, 1714-5).67
 Ibid.. The verb ‘must’ is underlined in Gramsci’s handwritten original. See A. Gramsci  Quaderni del 68
Carcere, Edizione anastatica dei manoscritti, a cura di G. Francioni, vol. 16, Cagliari, Fondazione Istituto 
Gramsci, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, e Unione Sarda, 2009, p. 68. Gramsci had already analysed 
the theatre industry, in his early writings, as an exploitative cultural business in Italy. On Gramsci’s early 
work as theatre critic in Turin, see G. Davico Bonino, Gramsci e il teatro, Torino, Einaudi, 1972, and R.S. 
Dombroski, ‘On Gramsci’s theater criticism’, boundary 2, 14 (3), 1986, pp. 91-117, as well as the 
anthology of Gramsci’s articles in CW pp. 54-86.
 FS 153-4 (Q 14, 56, 1715).69
 FS 154 (Q 14, 56, 1715).70
 In this article, I adopt the method used by Gianni Francioni for distinguishing between specific 71
discussions and the extraction of general concepts in Gramsci’s prison notebooks. According to Francioni, 
by analysing historical phenomena which presented similarities with contemporary ones that he wished to 
interpret, Gramsci constructed an ‘analogic model’ to test hypotheses that could then be extracted as 
general categories of political science and applied to the analysis of contemporary phenomena on the 
grounds of the isomorphism of the laws governing the two processes; for Francioni this was the method 
used by Gramsci to construct the concept of hegemony. See Francioni, G. L’officina gramsciana, 
Bibliopolis, Napoli, 1984, p. 177.
 A discussion of Gramsci’s notes on journalism falls outside the scope of this essay. For an introduction 72
and anthology of relevant notes, see CW 386-425.
 CW 122 (Q 23, 7, 2193). 73
 Ibid.. In CW, Gramsci’s original word ‘neolalismo’, is translated as ‘neology’ (p. 122), which would be 74
re-translated, in Italian, as ‘neologismo’. However, Gramsci's mention of the pathological element 
confirms that he did not refer to ‘neologismo’, which is the outcome of the normal creation of new words 
in a language, but to the Italian medical term ‘neolalìa’, which refers to a ‘disorder of expression that is 
characteristic of paranoid dementia, by which, in language, neologisms prevail over the words of the 
common language’ (‘Neolalìa’, in Dizionario Treccani della lingua italiana, online edition, accessed 25 
July 2011, my translation). Apparently neolalìa is a more specific disorder than the mere introduction of 
neologisms consisting of words composed of fragments of different words or of words used out of 
context, as in schizophrenia (‘Neologismo’, in ibid.).
 Q 23, 7, 2193, my translation. In the quotation, I have replaced the translated word ‘neology’ with 75
Gramsci's original 'neolalismo'. See Note 38.
 This could be seen as one of the ways in which Gramsci’s studies in linguistics constituted a general 76
paradigm for understanding the role of culture in social relations. For analyses of how Gramsci’s studies 
in linguistics constituted a basis from which he developed his particular understanding of the concept of 
hegemony, see F. Lo Piparo, Lingua, intellettuali, egemonia in Gramsci, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1979, P. 
Ives, ‘The grammar of hegemony’, Left History, 5 (1), Spring, 1997, and P. Ives, Language and 
Hegemony in Gramsci, Pluto Press, 2004.
 CW 98 (Q 23, 6, 2192), my emphasis. For a broader analysis of Gramsci’s critique of spontaneism, see 77
Sassoon, Gramsci's Politics, p. 133. 
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 In CW Gramsci’s original expression ‘politica di cultura’ is translated as ‘cultural politics’, the same 78
term used for Gramsci’s expression ‘politica culturale’, but no explanation is given for this choice. Yet, 
the fact that Gramsci used two different expressions within the same note should be taken to mean that in 
this particular case he felt the need to express two different concepts. Given that the Italian verb ‘stabilire’ 
used by Gramsci in this passage means ‘organise in a definitive way, establish, constitute’ (G. Devoto and 
G. Oli, Vocabolario della lingua italiana, Le Monnier, 2011), ‘politica di cultura’ should be understood 
as a normative concept rather than as a merely analytical one as in ‘cultural politics’ (see note 13). As a 
consequence, it should be translated with a normative concept distinct from the general concept of 
‘cultural policy’.
 CW 123 (Q 23, 7, 2194). 79
 CW 123 (Q 23, 7, 2195). 80
 CW 100 (15, 58, 1820).81
 See CW 187 (Q 29, 7, 2350). CW translates Gramsci’s expression ‘politica culturale-nazionale’ as 82
‘national-cultural politics’. However, there is little doubt that Gramsci here meant ‘cultural policy’ rather 
than ‘cultural politics’.
 CW 187 (Q 29, 7, 2350). 83
 See P. Ives, ‘Language, Agency and Hegemony: A Gramscian Response to Post-Marxism’, Critical 84
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 8 (4), 2005, p. 465.
 SPN 451 (Q 11, 24, 1428).85
 CW 183-4 (Q 29, 3, 2346).86
 CW 188 (Q 29, 7, 2350).87
 CW 130 (Q 14, 65, 1725).88
 However, it seems that for Gramsci there was a fundamental difference between the creation of a new 89
culture and the creation of new art. Although the arts were part of culture, they could not be a direct 
object of cultural policy-making because new art was (and should be) an organic consequence of the 
establishment of a new culture (or civilisation): ‘art is always tied to a definite culture or civilization and 
(...) by fighting to reform culture one comes to modify the “content” of art and works to create a new art, 
not from the outside (by professing a didactic, moralistic or prescriptive art) but from deep within’. CW 
201 (Q 21, 1, 2109). 
 CW 130-31 (Q 14, 65, 1725).90
 See note 13.91
 CW 131 (Q 14, 65, 1725). In the quotation, I have replaced the translated expression ‘cultural politics’ 92
with Gramsci’s original ‘politica culturale’. 
 CW 129 (Q 14, 65, 1724).93
 CW 130 (Q 14, 65, 1724). 94
 Ibid. 95
 CW 130 (Q 14, 65, 1725).96
 Ibid. 97
 SPN 301 (22, 11, 2164).98
 CW 130 (Q 14, 65, 1725). 99
 CW 130 (Q 14, 65, 1724-5). 100
 CW 128 (Q 14, 2, 1656).101
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 CW 130 (Q 14, 65, 1725).103
 CW 125-6 (Q 14, 67, 1726). 104
 PN3 126 (Q 6, 170, 821). 105
 Ibid. 106
 PN3 126-7 (Q 6, 170, 821).107
 23
 It is possible to argue that what is understood as cultural policy in today’s cultural policy studies (i.e. 108
cultural action by the state traditionally understood, or political society), to which Gramsci referred as 
‘the cultural policy of governments’, was for him typical of bourgeois society, while in socialist society it 
constituted a phase that only lasted until the coercive element of the state withered away by being 
absorbed by civil society. With the concept of cultural policy without further specification, in fact, 
Gramsci seemed to understand the broader phenomenon within the integral state, encompassing the 
development of cultural institutions, strategies, policies, and plans.
 Civil society ‘operates without “sanctions” or compulsory “obligations”, but nevertheless exerts a 109
collective pressure and obtains objective results in the form of an evolution of customs, ways of thinking 
and acting, morality, etc.’ (SPN 242; Q 13, 7, 1566). 
  SPN 271 (Q 6, 10, 691). 110
 D. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005. Harvey’s critical 111
analysis of the neoliberal restructuring of the relationship between state and civil society draws on some 
of Gramsci’s concepts and seems influenced by Gramsci’s theories of hegemony and of the integral state.
 D. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism.112
 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism.113
 PN1 156 (Q 1, 48, 59) and Q 13, 37, 1638.114
 A.S. Sassoon, Gramsci and Contemporary Politics. Beyond Pessimism of the Intellect, London and 115
New York, Routledge, 2000, p. 40.
 Sassoon, Gramsci and Contemporary Politics.116
 Sassoon, Gramsci and Contemporary Politics, p. 41.117
 As we have seen in Part One, Gramsci’s theory of cultural policy has been construed by the Australian 118
school of cultural policy studies as in antithesis to a ‘governmentality’ theoretical model extrapolated 
from Foucault, on the basis of the alleged compatibility of the governmentality model with a reformist-
technocratic conception of cultural policy and with a neoliberal conception of the governmental function. 
It is not within the scope of this article to carry out a critique of the ‘governmentality’ model of cultural 
policy studies. However, to avoid a misunderstanding of Gramsci’s theory of cultural policy as a 
consequence of a comparison with what is in fact a particular interpretation of Foucault, it is perhaps 
useful to point out that such an interpretation is open to question, as Foucault seemed critical of the 
neoliberal strengthening of the governmental function. Significant similarities as well as differences 
between Gramsci’s and Foucault’s understanding of issues of ideology and culture have been noted (see, 
for example, Ives, Language and Hegemony in Gramsci, pp. 138-144). In relation to questions of cultural 
policy, the idea, put forward through the allegedly Foucauldian ‘governmentality’ model, that from the 
18th century the government started to be seen as ‘acting on the social’ seems compatible with Gramsci’s 
theory of the integral state.
 In support of this argument see J.A. Buttigieg, ‘The Contemporary Discourse on Civil Society: A 119
Gramscian  Critique’, boundary 2, 32 (1), 2005, pp. 33-52.
 SPN 172-3 (Q 13, 16, 1577). 120
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